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Abstract 
 
This paper recites a number of lessons about charitable organizations that were learned 
during my tenure as a state charities regulator and uses these insights to question whether 
it is appropriate to understand these organizations by comparing them to for-profit firms.  
The paper concludes that this comparison is not helpful and argues for limited regulation 
by state attorneys general. 
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Introduction 
 
I spent five years as the Director of the Division of Public Charities for the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.  The Director is responsible for fulfilling the common 
law responsibilities of the Attorney General as well as certain statutory functions under 
G. L. c 12 and c. 68.  For reasons which I discuss below, I believe that Office of the 
Attorney General is, in fact, the correct place for charitable oversight.   
As an ex-regulator, I can be forgiven for bristling at the frequent suggestion that state 
regulation is inevitably inadequate.  Certainly, there are some states that devote only a 
few resources to this important job, but there other states that have active and effective 
offices.  In Massachusetts, from 1979 to 1984, the Division had six lawyers including one 
lawyer who was also a C.P.A.  In addition, there were eight administrative staff members 
assigned to the Division.  This may seem small compared to the tens of thousands 
registered charities, but the Division was able to set priorities that resulted in significant 
levels of accountability.  While the Division registered about 10,000 charities, many of 
these had only nominal funding.  State law required an audited financial statement from 
each charity with income in excess of $100,000 and the Division was active in enforcing 
this requirement.  We examined all audited statements for irregularities and had a 
regularized system for follow-up.  In the course of a year, the Division contacted 
hundreds of organizations seeking explanations and, in some case, changes in their 
practices.  In appropriate cases, we filed law suits.  In addition, the Division followed up 
on all disputes and allegations that came to its attention.  Typically, these cases involved 
disputes among various members of the charity’s constituency and the Division was often 
able to play a constructive role in resolving them.  It also launched several different 
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initiatives aimed at attacking problems in the non-profit sector.  One of these was an on-
going effort to address the escalation in health care costs.  This initiative included 
participation in Blue Cross rate hearings, enforcement of hospital Hill-Burton 
responsibilities, and participation in selected litigation.  Another was an initiative aimed 
at the problems attendant on charitable gambling.    This included the drafting and 
enforcement of regulations, an education campaign for local police and communication 
with charitable organizations to be sure that they were actually receiving proceeds.  All of 
this may not have constituted an optimum level of regulation – in fact I am sure there 
were some charities who thought it was overregulation – but neither was it insignificant. 
I tell you this in part because I am proud of the Division and what it accomplished.  
But, more importantly, I believe that my experience provides a somewhat different 
perspective for thinking about issues of accountability.  This presentation is divided into 
three sections.  In the first, I describe four lessons that I learned from daily contact with 
all segments of the charitable community.  Some of them you already know, but they 
deserve emphasis.  In the second section, I will offer some thoughts on how we should 
model charitable organizations.  There has been a tendency in the literature to analogize 
charitable organizations to for-profit firms and then to try to isolate the differences 
between them in terms of market imperfections.  I disagree with this approach and will 
offer a somewhat different model.  In the third section, I will offer my own thoughts 
about the best form of charitable oversight.  Not surprisingly, I favor state regulation, but 
I also have a number of thoughts about how such regulation should be handled.  
 
I. Lessons Learned  
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Lesson #1:  Charitable organizations are properly formed 
for many different purposes, not all of which are altruistic. 
 
The definition of a charitable organization – one that is formed to benefit the 
indefinite public – seems to suggest that a spirit of altruism lies at the heart of every 
charitable gift.  However, this is not entirely true.  Donors may give to the nameless 
public, but they may also specify the kind of benefit that should be subsidized.  For 
example, people who give to the Boston Symphony or to their Church, are usually 
supporting a specialized kind of activity in which they are personally interested.  And, of 
course, there is nothing wrong with this.  Such institutions enrich community life, expand 
the possibilities that are open to its citizens, and allow for the specialized practice of 
cultural and religious traditions.   Nevertheless, it is wrong to see all charities as founded 
on altruism.  Other motivations include the desire for self-expression, a devotion to 
certain religious practices; a wish to participate in community life, and a need to facilitate 
minority populations and viewpoints.  Exhibit 1 provides a break down of these 
motivations and some common examples.   
Lesson #2:  Charities utilize various forms of governance.  
 
The rise of modern not-for-profit incorporation statutes has led to the assumption that 
most charitable organizations share the same structure.   Under such acts, charitable 
corporations typically have a board of directors and a statutory set of officers.  In 
addition, some organizations may elect to have certain kinds of membership 
participation.  But, as every lawyer knows, these formal requirements do not effectively 
control the internal governance of the organization.  Each organization has its own norms 
of participatory decision making and these differ radically.  Some charities – hospitals, 
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universities, museums, etc. – resemble for-profit corporations in their decision making 
practices, but most do not.   
First, there are variations in the activity level of boards.  Some are self-perpetuating 
and function as “rubber stamps” for the organization’s management.  Other boards 
assume an active role.  There are even some that are so active that they impede the ability 
of the organization to function.   Second, there is question of which constituency 
dominates the organization.  Some organizations respond primarily to staff interests – 
functioning as collectives of professional workers.  Others may be run by the client 
community.  Still others respond primarily to donors.  Third, many organizations have a 
membership as well as a board.  In some cases, the membership is simply a collection of 
individually small donors who have no governance responsibilities.  In other cases, the 
charity functions more like a private club with members possessing the right to elect all 
or part of the board.  Fourth, many charities have other devices that provide constituency 
input.  There are advisory groups, employee groups, client committees, alumnae 
associations, visiting committees, and so forth.  Such groups serve as a focus for 
discussion and their input can have a powerful influence on community acceptance, 
donor activity and board decision making.  Thus, while these groups may have no legal 
authority, their role in charitable governance should not be minimized.   
 6
Lesson #3:  Charitable programs defy measurement.     
 
Many charities produce goods and services that can be quantified, but this does not 
mean that the output of the organization can be meaningfully compared with other similar 
organizations.  Should we, for example, compare the average cost of educating one 
undergraduate at Harvard with the same cost at U. Mass. Lowell?  Or even with “peer” 
institutions such as Princeton or Yale?  Or, if we want to think about the effectiveness of 
a symphony orchestra, should we compare it to other orchestras by looking at the average 
cost of the events it sponsors?   The problem is that values such as such as student 
formation, cutting edge programming, and performing excellence are not easily 
quantified; and, while this fact may lead some people to be skeptical about these values, 
some people are not and those people have every right to support the organizations that 
pursue them.   
Lesson #4:  The ability to undertake charitable activity 
in one’s own way is an essential aspect of human 
freedom.   
 
When thinking about charitable accountability, it is easy to forget that those who are 
involved in charitable activity are exercising fundamental rights – rights to think as they 
please: to raise their voices; and to attack community problems in whatever way seems 
best to them.  The limits on this freedom are not hard to see.  Charities should not harm 
others; they should not solicit funds with false representations; and the officers of a 
charity should faithfully discharge their fiduciary duties.  Nevertheless, even when a 
regulator is enforcing these duties, he or she should not forget to ask:  Am I interfering 
with the ability of private citizens to act in accordance with their own particular vision of 
the public good.  For example, while I was at the Division, a routine inspection of an 
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audited statement disclosed that an organization had its entire endowment invested in 
South African gold stocks.   The issue was whether the board had breached its fiduciary 
duties by investing in a way that was both risky and undiversified.  The organization 
itself was a politically conservative research institute and argued strenuously that the 
investment in question represented an investment strategy that was fully in line with their 
donors’ beliefs.  After examining their literature and their solicitation materials, we were 
forced to agree, finally deciding  that such an investment strategy was part of the 
charity’s identity, a part of what made it desirable to so many of its donors and 
participants.   
II. Modeling Charitable Activity  
If you look at the economic literature, you will see that most discussions of non-profit 
activity begin with the concept of a not-for-profit firm that is, in every way, like it’s for- 
profit analogue except that it is not allowed to distribute earnings.  In economic theory, a 
firm is a black box that internalizes a number of informal arrangements.  Internal 
arrangements are matters of governance and consequently they are the province of those 
who work inside the firm.  For those who are outside the firm, the firm is judged not by 
its internal governance but by its results.  Inputs are compared with outputs and the 
resulting measures of efficiency are compared with other similar firms.   For a market 
based economist, the inability of a non-profit firm to distribute earnings makes it more 
difficult to assess efficiency.  There is no bottom line, no concept of net earnings.*  
Nevertheless, some have tried to assess efficiency by comparison to similar for-profit 
                                                 
* Charitable accounting is fundamentally different from for-profit accounting.  Where for-profit firms have 
profits, not-for profit firms have an excess of revenues over expenses.  When a for-profit firm does not 
distribute earnings, it maintains a retained earnings account.  Under similar circumstances the charity books 
the excess of revenue over expenses to its fund balance.  These differences are not merely technical; they 
represent fundamental differences in function between non-profit and for-profit firms.   
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entities.  A charitable, hospital, for example, competes with for-profit hospitals and it is 
possible to compare their per patient costs with those of the for-profit.  However, these 
kinds of comparisons rarely hold up.  The charitable hospital may be a research hospital 
that funds research as well as care; or it may see sicker patients; or it may engage in 
public education.  Indeed, there are a number of ways in which attempts to quantify the 
value of non-profit activity become frustrated.  Imagine, for example, two organizations 
that seek community support.  One proceeds by hiring a professional media consultant; 
the other by using its own homegrown outreach program.  The first charity may do 
measurably better, but the second may claim that the efficiency of its campaign was less 
important than the need to train and empower its participants.  A quantitative comparison 
of the two organizations cannot be completed unless we are willing to monetize the 
second charity’s accomplishments; and it is difficult to see how this can be done unless 
we make a subjective comparison between the value of community empowerment vis a 
vis the value of community support.  Let me give another example that involves our two 
institutions.  Boston College pays its service workers better than Harvard does.  While 
this might appear inefficient to some, it embodies the notion of community that is part of 
the Jesuit tradition.   
Aside from problems of quantification, charities pose a challenge to the very concept 
of economic efficiency.  We determine efficiency by comparing inputs and outputs.  This 
requires that there be a clear distinction between them.  Because charitable organizations 
have no bottom line they reflect a lot of different values.  This fact gives rise to real 
questions as to what should be counted as inputs and outputs of the organization. Should 
a volunteer’s time be treated as an input if the volunteer herself is enriched by the 
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experience?  If we classify financial help for the victims of Katrina as an output, how 
should we count their need – should we count it as an “input” because it has 
demonstrable value in stimulating fundraising?   
   The final problem with thinking about efficiency in the non-profit context comes 
from asking the question: Efficient for whom?  Since Coase, we have recognized that 
firms are formed because they avoid the information and transaction costs that may 
distort market pricing.  In short, the firm provides a mechanism that facilitates internal 
and informal exchanges.  If we apply this analysis to charitable organizations, should we 
think of them as solving information and transaction problems for donors?  Or should we 
think of it the other way – starting with the assumption that a firm is a collective of 
people with needs who wish to avoid the inefficiencies of individual solicitation?  Our 
assessment of the organization’s efficiency will depend upon which starting point we 
select..  
In view of these difficulties, it might make sense to think about charitable 
organizations as being something that is essentially different from a for-profit firm.  My 
suggestion is that we think of an individual charity as a “consumption group” that is 
organized around the project of meeting human needs.  Because such groups consume 
rather than produce, they are governed by individual preferences rather than the concept 
of efficiency.  For example, it may be more efficient in some sense to drink milk rather 
than champagne, but the decision to do the latter is not irrational if one’s preference is, all 
things considered, champagne.  In economic terms, preferences are a given.  They 
provide the basis by which all other things are judged.   
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I do not mean to suggest that the concept of efficiency is entirely irrelevant to 
charitable organizations.  Efficiency enters the picture in two ways.  First, efficiency is 
relevant to any consumption group on a secondary level – once preferences are decided 
upon, the rational decision maker will select the most efficient way to satisfy them.  
Second, charities depend on the kindness of others and these others may well have a 
preference for efficient management of resources.  While these types of efficiency are 
important, they do not provide a touchstone for charitable accountability.  We need a 
different way to assess the success of non-profits and to think about the circumstances 
under which state intervention is warranted.   
In the next section, I will use the notion of a consumption group to define an 
approach to charitable accountability.  I will do this by beginning with the other, more 
common, example of a consumption group – the American family.  Families play many 
roles but, as economic entities, they function as a collection of consumers whose 
individual levels of consumption are determined, not by the market, but by an internal 
allocation mechanism.  Families, like charities, have obligations that extend beyond 
personal consumption.  For example, each family has a responsibility to care for certain 
of its members who are not able to care for themselves.  Since charities have a similar 
function, I will begin my discussion of charitable accountability by looking at the type of 
accountability that we impose on families. I will then consider whether there are 
differences between charities and families that necessitate additional forms of 
accountability? 
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III. Providing for Accountability 
Families are accountable for providing care for their members.  The accountability 
imposed by the state in this respect is does not take the form of regulation.  The state does 
not mandate that certain steps must be taken.  Nor does it attempt to second guess the 
soundness of particular decisions.  Rather, the approach is more holistic.  The state must 
decide whether the parents are so failing in their responsibilities to the child that an 
extreme remedy – the severing of parental rights – should be imposed.  Poor or inefficient 
parents rarely lose their children.  What is required is a fundamental inability or 
unwillingness to meet the child’s basic needs.  One reason for this high standard is that 
we understand the damage that is done when families are torn apart.  Another reason is 
the fact that parents have a right to raise their children in whatever way they think fit so 
long as there is no significant and demonstrable damage to the child.  Similar arguments 
apply to charities as well.  First, the charity may perish in the face of state intervention.  
Volunteers, donors, and even trade creditors are unlikely to support an organization that 
is “having trouble with the state.”  Second, like parents, charitable organizations have a 
right to address human needs in whatever way that they see fit.  For this reason, 
accountability should not take the form of weighing efficiency or mandating certain 
forms of preferred behaviors.  What is needed is not regulation, but oversight.  As with 
families – the state is there primarily to be sure that no real harm is done.  
In addition to this kind of oversight, there are at least two aspects of charitable 
activity that deserve special attention.  Charities are different from families in that there is 
a separation between control and beneficence.  In a family, the decision makers – the 
parents – are the same people who produce the funds and effort that are used for 
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consumption.  But, in a charity, the resources come from donors who may have little 
control over its operations.  This means that those who run charities have fiduciary 
obligations that must be enforceable through the courts.  Nor should we forget that 
donors have an autonomous right to direct the use of their property.  To facilitate this 
right, it is important that charitable organizations maintain a certain level of transparency.  
This means that financial information should be readily available from the charity itself 
or from government actors.  It is also important that charities be held to a strict level of 
honesty in the materials it uses to solicit funds from the public. 
The comparison between the regulation of families and the regulation of charities 
highlights three areas that should be subject to regulation.  The first is the requirement of 
functionality.  Taken as a whole, is the charity so dysfunctional that it requires state 
intervention despite the costs of such intervention?  Second, there is the requirement of 
transparency.  Do donors, volunteers, members, customers, and beneficiaries have 
enough understanding of the organization to make their own autonomous decisions about 
how to participate?  Third, there is the related question of honesty.  Is the charity 
misrepresenting itself or its activities in order to obtain support?   
Those who are familiar with charities law will note that these three areas track the 
types of actions that may be maintained by the Attorney General against charitable 
trustees.  For those who are not, I have set out these parallels in Exhibit 2.   It is this 
similarity that forms the basis for my recommendation that charitable regulation should 
remain with the state attorneys general.†  In addition, there are two other considerations 
that support this result.  First, state oversight is better than national oversight because 
                                                 
† In addition, the Internal Revenue Service should play an important but limited role in protecting the tax 
system from abuse of the charitable deduction.  .   
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most charities are local and therefore best understood in the local context.  For example, 
there are a large number of charities in Massachusetts that provide social services under 
contract with the state.  Understanding the financing of these organizations requires 
knowledge of state contracting practices.  Second, when the state moves to cut off  
parental rights, it must do so in a court of law because only the judiciary can terminate 
such fundamental rights.  The same is true of charitable oversight.  The Attorney General 
has no inherent power to change the officers of a charitable organization or to order its 
dissolution.  Such powers are reserved for the courts.  This means that the Department of 
the Attorney General is the correct location for state oversight because the Attorney 
General is the only state actor who is empowered to represent the public interest in a 
court of law.   
So far, all I have done is to endorse the status quo.  I do, however, have three 
suggestions for new initiatives. 
Specific Proposals 
1. Creation of a consortium of State Attorneys General  
State Charities Officials have always collaborated through the offices of the National 
Association of Attorneys General and the National Association of State Charities 
Officials.  I would suggest that this collaboration be intensified in area of national 
charitable organizations.  Effective oversight requires the creation of a centralized office 
that can receive and monitor financial reports.  This will not only improve effectiveness; 
it will also reduce duplication of efforts.   
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2. Creation of a National Foundation to Provide Support Services to State 
Attorneys General  
 
One of the difficulties of decentralizing charitable oversight is that local offices may 
not have the experience and expertise that are necessary to undertake this important 
function.  It is possible, however, to provide services to individual offices that will enable 
them to expend their own limited resources in a more effective way.  For example, in the 
1980’s the National Charities Information Bureau had one person on staff that traveled 
from state to state assisting with computerization of charitable information.   This 
provided useful assistance to individual offices and, at the same time, facilitated 
nationwide coordination among them.  
3. Reevaluation of Various Forms of Specialized Regulation  
Certain types of charitable organizations offer services that affect the health or safety 
of the public and are therefore subject to more substantive regulation by state or federal 
agencies.  Hospitals, for example, have their facilities and procedures regulated by state 
boards of health; their finances regulated by state rate setting commissions, and their 
ability to do business controlled by state licensing boards.  They are also subject to 
numerous private requirements from health insurance companies, professional groups, 
and other interested parties.  In such instances where charitable status overlaps with 
substantive regulation, those who are enforcing substantive regulation need to be better 
informed about the charitable context.  State Charities Officials should therefore think 
about training programs for appropriate federal, state and local officials.   
Conclusion 
 
I recognize that I am advocating a position that looks very much like the status quo.  
While this does not seem very innovative, my five years of experience with the 
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Massachusetts Attorney General did not convince me that fundamental changes were 
needed.  Certainly, more resources would be helpful but the amounts involved are 
relatively small and well within the means of most state legislatures.   
The charitable sector is extremely important and it deserves the right type and level of 
oversight.  Regulation will not deter for-profit enterprises so long as they are able to bear 
the cost of regulation and still return a competitive rate to invested capital.  It is the 
compelling force of human greed that guarantees this result.  Charities, on the other hand, 
are more vulnerable to the risks of overregulation.  They depend on motivations that are 
more subtle than greed.  Compassion, the desire to be involved and the need for creativity 
can be easily derailed by well meaning attempts at accountability.   But a lack of 
accountability is not the answer either.  There is danger in ignoring charitable abuses.  If 
mismanagement becomes apparent, the public becomes reluctant to continue giving.  
Personality disputes, contentious boards, and failures to communicate invevitably lead to 
a dissipation of interest in the affected organization and the charitable cause it represents.  
These two sets of concerns form the Schylla and Charybdis of charitable oversight and 
those who seek to regulate charities must walk the fine line between them and avoid both 
damaging interference and damaging neglect.    
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Exhibit 1 
Breakdown of Charitable Purposes  
 
 
Purpose 
 
Examples 
 
 
Vehicles For Generosity And 
Compassion For Others 
 
The American Red Cross 
United Way 
Habitat for Humanity 
 
 
Forums For Religious Practices 
 
The Catholic Church 
The American Friends Service Comm. 
Andover-Newton Theological Seminary 
 
 
Opportunities For Self-Expression
 
The Charles Peirce Society 
The Boston Historical Society 
 
 
Opportunities For Community 
Participation 
 
 
The Parent-Teacher Association 
The Friends of the Framingham Hospital 
Alcoholics Anonymous 
 
 
Resources For Community Life 
 
The Boston Symphony 
National Public Radio 
Harvard University 
 
 
A Platform For Minority 
Populations And Minority 
Views To Flourish 
 
 
Hellenic College 
The Jewish Community Center 
The United Negro College Fund 
 
It can be argued that some of these organizations serve more than one purpose.  For 
example, Hellenic College provides a community resource (an educational institution) as 
well as a platform for a minority population (the Greek-American community).  Charities 
often defy easy categorization and this is part of the reason why the issue of 
accountability seems so intractable.   
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          Exhibit 2 
 
Charitable Oversight 
 
 
 
 
Type of Accountability 
 
 
Common Law 
Actions against Charitable 
Trustees 
 
 
Actions against  
Modern Charitable 
Corporations 
 
Functionality 
Taken as a whole, is the 
charity so dysfunctional that it 
requires state intervention 
despite the costs of such 
intervention?   
 
Petition for Removal – A trustee 
can be removed when his 
derelictions are so egregious as to 
impede the fulfillment of the trust.   
 
Petition for Cy Pres – The purpose 
of a trust can be amended when the 
original purpose is no longer capable 
of fulfillment.  ‡
 
 
Actions for Appointment 
of a Receiver  
 
Petition for Dissolution 
 
Action for Cy Pres 
 
Transparency 
Do donors, volunteers, 
members, customers, and 
beneficiaries have enough 
understanding of the 
organization to make their own 
autonomous decisions about 
how to participate?   
 
 
Action for an Accounting 
 
Annual Registration and 
Financial Disclosure 
 
 
Honesty 
Is the charity misrepresenting 
itself or its activities in order to 
obtain support?   
 
 
 
Action for Breach Of Fiduciary 
Duties – The trustee has a duty of 
loyalty and a duty of care and these 
may be enforced in a suit by the 
Attorney General. 
 
 
Action for Breach 
Of Fiduciary Duties 
 
Action for Fraudulent or 
Deceptive Solicitation 
Practices 
 
 
                                                 
‡ An action for Cy Pres can be initiated either by the trustee or by the Attorney General.  If it is initiated by 
the trustee, the Attorney General is a necessary party. 
 18
